Registration refuses the reserved names Progmasoft and Leitwolf, which are meant to be created by trusted operations tooling only, and that tooling did not exist: the Progmasoft account, the publisher of Progmasoft's Tazel plugins on ViGet, could not be created at all. - 'accounts provision-reserved <Name> <email>' runs with the configuration of the service, like the viget commands. It accepts only the reserved names, applies the rules of registration to the email address and the password, never replaces an existing account, and brings the account tables to the current schema first. - The password is read from the terminal without echo, twice, or from one line of standard input when it is not a terminal; it never appears on a command line or in the output. - AccountNamePolicy.TryNormalizeReserved checks a reserved name; TryNormalize, which registration uses, still refuses it. Tests cover a reserved account created and signing in with its password, a name that is not reserved, two different passwords, a weak password, an existing account and the usage line. ops/README.md shows the command with systemd-run --pty; docs/ACCOUNT-API.md points to it.
ViGet opens in stages: first only Progmasoft publishes Tazel plugins, later every account. This adds the catalog and the server-side publishing for the first stage; nothing publishes through the API yet. - ViGet/: the catalog of Tazel plugins (in memory, or in PostgreSQL beside the accounts with its own numbered schema steps), the descriptor read from the JAR (META-INF/tazel-plugin.properties, with a reader of the Java properties format, and the ProjectPlugin service entry), and publishing: the publisher must be in ViGet:TazelPublishers (Progmasoft for now) and an existing account of that exact name, a version is never replaced, names that differ only in letter case are refused, and ViGet needs a description, an author and a license. The JAR is kept at dslplugins/tazel/<Publisher>/<Name>/<Version>/<Name>-<Version>.jar below ViGet:ArtifactRoot. - Read endpoints under /api/v1/viget/dslplugins/tazel: the list, a plugin, and index.json, the index Tazel reads. - 'viget publish-tazel-plugin <jar>' and 'viget yank-tazel-plugin' run with the configuration of the service instead of the service. - The account store can find an account by name. The pages, the Nginx routes and the deployment follow.
Progmasoft OAuth now runs on three hosts: - credentials.progmasoft.com stays the issuer: discovery documents, key set, token, user information, revocation and introspection. - authorize.progmasoft.com serves the pages people see: the authorization and end session endpoints (registered with OpenIddict as absolute URIs on that host), sign-in, the consent screen and the applications an account has allowed. - console.progmasoft.com is the Progmasoft Console. Its overview links the areas; OAuth 2.1 tokens live under /credentials, with New token, then the application type, then its form. The console has no sign-in of its own and never redirects. It uses the Progmasoft account session, so production now shares that cookie with progmasoft.com (__Secure-ProgmasoftSession, Domain=progmasoft.com, HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite=Lax). Without AccountSessions:CookieDomain the cookie stays host-only with the __Host- name, as in development and tests. Application types replace the confidential/public switch: web, single-page, desktop, mobile and service. Each type has its redirection rules (RFC 8252), its secret or none, and its grants; only a service uses client credentials and it registers no address or scope. The type is kept as an application property and cannot change. The HTML pages of the API are gone. The pages are Next.js pages in four languages (en-US, de-DE, ru-RU, he-IL) that call JSON endpoints under /api/v1/oauth. Requests that change state must come from the page's own origin; antiforgery forms are no longer needed. The token, revocation and user information endpoints answer CORS requests from the origins of single-page applications, without credentials; the discovery documents and the key set answer every origin. The host filter keeps every path on its host. Nginx gains the authorize and console virtual hosts, and the docs describe the hosts, the types and the shared session.
Progmasoft accounts can now sign in to any application, and any developer can register one. The provider runs in the account API under the Progmasoft.OAuth namespaces and answers on credentials.progmasoft.com. Protocol: OpenIddict 7 (Apache-2.0) with its Entity Framework stores. Authorization code with PKCE for every client, S256 only; refresh tokens with rotation and no reuse leeway, so a replayed refresh token revokes its chain; client credentials for confidential clients, without account scopes. No implicit or password grant. Codes live 2 minutes, access and identity tokens 15 minutes, refresh tokens 30 days. Signing (RSA) and encryption keys are read from files in production and are required there; other environments make keys per process. Scopes, one grant each, as the consent page lists them: profile (the account name), email (the sign-in address; email_verified is false, since registration does not verify it), viget.packages.read, viget.packages.publish and viget.packages.yank (access tokens for the viget audience), and offline_access. Pages, plain HTML without script, behind a content security policy that allows the one stylesheet by digest: sign-in with the account password (a cookie of its own, no account-site session), consent with the application, its registering account and the return host, the developer portal (register confidential or public clients, redirect address rules from RFC 8252, scopes, client credentials, secret shown once and rotatable, delete; 10 applications per account; other accounts' applications are absent), and the applications an account has allowed, with withdrawal that revokes their tokens. Forms carry antiforgery tokens; return addresses stay on the host. Storage: the oauth_* tables in the account database, created by a numbered schema step like the account tables; the step is the script Entity Framework generates for the model, and a test compares the two. With the memory account store they live in a shared in-memory SQLite database, which runs the bulk revocations the in-memory provider cannot. A host filter keeps OAuth paths on the OAuth host and everything but OAuth and /health off it. AllowedHosts names the new host, and a rate limit policy covers the protocol endpoints and the portal. The Nginx vhost for the host and the key set-up are in ops; docs/OAUTH.md is the developer guide. AccountService gains VerifyPasswordAsync, which LoginAsync now uses, and FindAsync. Verified: dotnet build with warnings as errors; dotnet test, 125 tests, 109 passed and 16 PostgreSQL tests skipped locally (CI runs them, including a new one for the schema and refresh token chain revocation): code flow with PKCE and the claims of each scope, single-use codes, refresh rotation and reuse refusal, consent reuse and withdrawal, deny, public client with a private-use scheme, client credentials, ViGet audience by introspection, refusal without PKCE, of other flows and of unpermitted scopes, unregistered redirect addresses, sign-in redirects and prompt=none, the portal's address rules and ownership, secret rotation, the page security policy, the host filter and the discovery document.
A failed Google callback has returned the visitor to /login?google=failed since the previous release, but nothing recorded why: a declined consent, an expired or missing state cookie and a forged request all looked the same, and the log of the service held no entry at all. GoogleSignInFailure now handles OnRemoteFailure. It writes one warning, event GoogleSignInFailed (id 5), with the cause: the error code Google reported, such as access_denied, or the reason the handler refused the callback, such as "The oauth state was missing or invalid." An error code is written only when it is a short run of letters, digits, '_', '-' and '.'; anything else from the query string is written as an unrecognized error. The authorization code, the state and tokens are never logged. The redirect is unchanged. Four new tests cover the entry, the redirect, an unusual error value and a refused state. The account API document describes the log entry.
A Google callback that could not finish ended in an unhandled 500: a visitor who declined on Google's consent screen, a callback whose state cookie had expired, and a direct request to the callback path all got an empty error page. The account API document already promised a redirect to /login?google=failed for a failed callback; the handler of the Google scheme now does that through OnRemoteFailure. Three new tests cover a callback without state, a declined consent and a forged state. Three statements no longer matched the sites: - the bug report template still named the catalog paths without the language and the build system; they are /langs/tala/<Publisher>/<Name>/ and /dslplugins/tazel/<Publisher>/<Name>/; - the operations guide placed Tala content on xsharp-lang.xyz, which only redirects to tala.run now; - the architecture guide described the ViGet routing before the catalogs per language and build system: it now gives the rewrites of /langs/tala and /dslplugins/tazel, the redirects of /langs and /dslplugins, three indexed ViGet pages and a sitemap with the home page and both catalogs.
.com has no HSTS requirement of its own, but progmasoft.com is served as if it had one: - Every HTTPS server block of progmasoft.com, www, account and viget sends max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload. The www redirect sent none before. - Plain HTTP only answers the ACME challenge and otherwise redirects to HTTPS, now with a permanent 308 instead of 301. - The API's own HSTS policy, which it adds to HTTPS responses outside development, carries the same values, so a proxied response never shows two different policies. A test checks the header.
The account API kept everything in the memory of its process, so every restart and every deployment of the API deleted all accounts and signed everyone out. PostgresAccountStore implements IAccountStore on PostgreSQL through Npgsql. The three uniqueness rules are unique constraints, so two requests that race for one name, address or Google identity are decided by the database. A refused account is an ordinary answer, not an exception, and the rules are reported in the order the in-memory store reports them. A session refers to its account, and a session of an account that is not stored is refused; the in-memory store now refuses it as well. The schema is a list of numbered steps. The service takes the missing ones when it starts, in one transaction under an advisory lock, and does not start when the database cannot be reached or is newer than the release. /health answers 503 while the database does not answer. ConnectionStrings:Accounts selects PostgreSQL. A production service that is given no database does not start; keeping accounts in memory there has to be asked for with Accounts:Store=Memory. Development and the tests keep the in-memory store by default. The store gains RemoveExpiredSessionsAsync, and a background service calls it at the start and once an hour: a session whose token is never presented again no longer keeps its row for ever. PostgreSQL keeps a timestamp to the microsecond. The store cuts a moment to that precision and returns what it stored, and the service uses the returned account, so the creation time in the registration response equals the one every later read returns. Tests. AccountStoreContractTests states the rules once and runs them on both stores. Further tests cover the schema steps applied concurrently and a database that is too new, the choice of the store from the configuration, the removal of expired sessions, and an account with its session surviving a restart of the service over HTTP. The PostgreSQL tests read their database from PROGMAWEB_TEST_POSTGRES and work in a schema of their own each. Without the variable they are skipped; CI starts PostgreSQL 16 for them, and a test fails the run when the variable is missing there. Operations. ops/README.md describes the database: the Unix socket with peer authentication, so that no password exists, the one-time preparation, and rollback across a schema step. The service unit starts after PostgreSQL. docs/LIMITATIONS.md no longer lists the in-memory store and now lists the missing backup and the missing deletion of accounts.
With an empty Google client identifier or secret the API answered every request with 500, including registration, password sign-in and the status route. The Google scheme was always registered, and the authentication middleware initializes every remote scheme for each request; with empty credentials the validation of the Google options threw there, before any endpoint ran. The API could not be started locally without credentials, and the "Google sign-in is unavailable" answer of the start endpoint was never reached. The Google scheme is now registered only when both values are configured. Without it the service runs normally, the start endpoint answers 503, the completion endpoint redirects to the failed sign-in page without a session, and the callback path is not a route. With both values nothing changes. The test factory passes the two values as host settings. The program makes the decision while it registers services, and configuration sources a test factory adds are applied only when the host is built, after that point. New tests run the service without a Google client: the ordinary routes, a full register, sign-out and sign-in round trip, and the three Google paths. They failed with 500 against the previous program and pass now, also when the environment of the test run carries Google credentials. The guides no longer list this as a limitation or ask for placeholder credentials. Deploying this change restarts the API, which deletes every account while the store is in memory.