progmasoft.com/privacy and progmasoft.com/security publish the two
policies in en-US, de-DE, ru-RU and he-IL, and the footer links both.
The Privacy Policy says what an account keeps and that Progmasoft keeps
an IP address for one purpose only: with a ViGet upload, to establish
where an upload that turns out to be malicious software came from and
to give it to the competent authorities. It says that no data, the IP
address included, is sold, rented or traded. The Security Policy covers
passwords, sessions, HTTPS, the ban on malicious software in ViGet and
how to report a weakness.

The registration form asks the person to accept both policies, and the
API refuses a registration without that acceptance, with a password
(acceptPolicies, a validation error of that field) or through Google:
the start of a Google registration without acceptPolicies=true goes
back to /register?google=policies-required, and the completion creates
no account unless the authentication state carries the current version.
An account keeps the version it accepted and the moment, in two new
columns that schema step 2 adds; accounts created before it keep null.
PolicyAcceptance.CurrentVersion and policyVersion on the web side name
the same date, and a web test reads the C# constant to keep them equal.

Progmasoft OAuth now runs on three hosts:

- credentials.progmasoft.com stays the issuer: discovery documents, key
  set, token, user information, revocation and introspection.
- authorize.progmasoft.com serves the pages people see: the
  authorization and end session endpoints (registered with OpenIddict as
  absolute URIs on that host), sign-in, the consent screen and the
  applications an account has allowed.
- console.progmasoft.com is the Progmasoft Console. Its overview links
  the areas; OAuth 2.1 tokens live under /credentials, with New token,
  then the application type, then its form.

The console has no sign-in of its own and never redirects. It uses the
Progmasoft account session, so production now shares that cookie with
progmasoft.com (__Secure-ProgmasoftSession, Domain=progmasoft.com,
HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite=Lax). Without AccountSessions:CookieDomain the
cookie stays host-only with the __Host- name, as in development and tests.

Application types replace the confidential/public switch: web,
single-page, desktop, mobile and service. Each type has its redirection
rules (RFC 8252), its secret or none, and its grants; only a service
uses client credentials and it registers no address or scope. The type is
kept as an application property and cannot change.

The HTML pages of the API are gone. The pages are Next.js pages in four
languages (en-US, de-DE, ru-RU, he-IL) that call JSON endpoints under
/api/v1/oauth. Requests that change state must come from the page's own
origin; antiforgery forms are no longer needed. The token, revocation and
user information endpoints answer CORS requests from the origins of
single-page applications, without credentials; the discovery documents
and the key set answer every origin.

The host filter keeps every path on its host. Nginx gains the authorize
and console virtual hosts, and the docs describe the hosts, the types and
the shared session.

Progmasoft accounts can now sign in to any application, and any
developer can register one. The provider runs in the account API under
the Progmasoft.OAuth namespaces and answers on credentials.progmasoft.com.

Protocol: OpenIddict 7 (Apache-2.0) with its Entity Framework stores.
Authorization code with PKCE for every client, S256 only; refresh
tokens with rotation and no reuse leeway, so a replayed refresh token
revokes its chain; client credentials for confidential clients, without
account scopes. No implicit or password grant. Codes live 2 minutes,
access and identity tokens 15 minutes, refresh tokens 30 days. Signing
(RSA) and encryption keys are read from files in production and are
required there; other environments make keys per process.

Scopes, one grant each, as the consent page lists them: profile (the
account name), email (the sign-in address; email_verified is false,
since registration does not verify it), viget.packages.read,
viget.packages.publish and viget.packages.yank (access tokens for the
viget audience), and offline_access.

Pages, plain HTML without script, behind a content security policy that
allows the one stylesheet by digest: sign-in with the account password
(a cookie of its own, no account-site session), consent with the
application, its registering account and the return host, the developer
portal (register confidential or public clients, redirect address rules
from RFC 8252, scopes, client credentials, secret shown once and
rotatable, delete; 10 applications per account; other accounts'
applications are absent), and the applications an account has allowed,
with withdrawal that revokes their tokens. Forms carry antiforgery
tokens; return addresses stay on the host.

Storage: the oauth_* tables in the account database, created by a
numbered schema step like the account tables; the step is the script
Entity Framework generates for the model, and a test compares the two.
With the memory account store they live in a shared in-memory SQLite
database, which runs the bulk revocations the in-memory provider cannot.

A host filter keeps OAuth paths on the OAuth host and everything but
OAuth and /health off it. AllowedHosts names the new host, and a rate
limit policy covers the protocol endpoints and the portal. The Nginx
vhost for the host and the key set-up are in ops; docs/OAUTH.md is the
developer guide.

AccountService gains VerifyPasswordAsync, which LoginAsync now uses,
and FindAsync.

Verified: dotnet build with warnings as errors; dotnet test, 125 tests,
109 passed and 16 PostgreSQL tests skipped locally (CI runs them,
including a new one for the schema and refresh token chain revocation):
code flow with PKCE and the claims of each scope, single-use codes,
refresh rotation and reuse refusal, consent reuse and withdrawal, deny,
public client with a private-use scheme, client credentials, ViGet
audience by introspection, refusal without PKCE, of other flows and of
unpermitted scopes, unregistered redirect addresses, sign-in redirects
and prompt=none, the portal's address rules and ownership, secret
rotation, the page security policy, the host filter and the discovery
document.