Version 1.1 left programs built with Progmasoft tools under MPL-2.0 duties
for the code the tools place in them, and left other cases unclear.
Version 2.0 adds a generated code permission, covers runtime and standard
libraries, compiler transformations, interfaces and examples, and settles
how a file is identified and how to tell recipients about source.

Every project SPDX expression moves to AdditionRef-Progmasoft-Exception-2.0.
The older texts stay, because released versions name them.

macOS runners are the bottleneck of Progmasoft's CI: an organization
runs at most five macOS jobs at a time, shared by every repository, and a
pull request of Catch3 asked for about twenty of them. Every workflow
also listened to both push and pull_request, so each pull request ran
everything twice, once for its branch and once for the pull request.

macOS now has one job, as in the Tala compiler: macOS 26 on Apple
Silicon, Debug, C++17, with AddressSanitizer and UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer
over the most-tests preset, examples and extra tests. The C++14 and C++17,
Debug and Release matrix stays on Ubuntu and Fedora, where it already ran.
ThreadSanitizer, which ran only on macOS, moves to a new Ubuntu job.

The build systems that tested Windows and macOS (Bazel, Meson, Xmake,
Premake) test Windows and Ubuntu instead, with Clang, so their Unix side
is still covered and Linux is covered for the first time. The jobs that do
not depend on the platform leave macOS: CodeQL (build mode none), the
header and license checks, and native coverage, which now builds with
the Clang and LLVM tools of Ubuntu instead of those of Xcode.

Pushes build only devel; pull requests build their branches. The weekly
CodeQL schedule stays.

The required check "Bazel on macos-15" becomes "Bazel on ubuntu-26.04" in
the branch protection and the ruleset when this is merged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

zizmor audits the workflows themselves for what makes a workflow
unsafe, and uploads what it finds to code scanning. Its first run here
found one thing, 11 times: a checkout that leaves the job's token in
the checked-out repository, where any later step can read it. No
workflow pushes or needs the token after the checkout, so every checkout
now sets persist-credentials to false, and zizmor reports nothing.

OpenSSF Scorecard grades how the repository is kept: branch protection,
pinned dependencies, token permissions and the like. It runs on the
default branch and weekly and uploads its findings to
code scanning.

Dependency Review fails a pull request that adds or changes a dependency
with a known vulnerability of high severity or worse. Dependabot watches
what is already there; this holds what comes in.

Every new action is pinned to a commit, each job names the permissions
it needs, and no new workflow has a default permission.

Two steps of the Windows build ran in the CMD shell, which zizmor cannot

read into; they run in PowerShell now, with the same commands and the

processor count taken from the environment.